Works in Progress

“Truth-Sensitivity and DNA evidence”

“Distinguishing Bare Statistical Evidence and Individualized Evidence: An Account of Hypothetical Truth-Sensitivity in Legal Proceedings” (under review)

Abstract: There are numerous attempts to explain what’s wrong with using so-called “bare statistical evidence” (BSE) to render legal findings. According to one proposal, BSE is deficient because findings based on it are not counterfactually Sensitive to truth: though the defendant is factually at fault, were the defendant not at fault, the factfinder would still find them liable on the basis of the BSE. This proposal is compelling to me, but it faces counterexamples. Thus, I adapt the proposal arguing that BSE is deficient because findings based on it are not “hypothetically” Sensitive to truth: from the factfinder's perspective, were the defendant not at fault, the factfinder would still find them liable on the basis of the BSE.